Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D. 
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K. 
Expires: August 2007                                           Kent, S. 
Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies 
                                                          February 2007 
                                      
    Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice 
       Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP address and AS Number PKI 
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-00.txt 


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Abstract 

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a 
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry 
   (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Internet 
   IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key 
   Infrastructure (PKI).    





 
 
 
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Conventions used in this document 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. 

Table of Contents 

    
   Preface...........................................................8 
   1. Introduction...................................................9 
      1.1. Overview.................................................10 
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 
         1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12 
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 
      1.5. Policy administration....................................13 
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 
         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 
         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14 
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 
      2.1. Repositories.............................................15 
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................16 
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................17 
      3.1. Naming...................................................17 
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.18 
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 
 
 
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         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 
      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key19 
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after 
         revocation.................................................19 
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20 
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions21 
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21 
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of 
         certificate................................................22 
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 
         entities [OMITTED].........................................23 
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................23 
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........23 
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............23 
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................23 
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................24 
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................24 
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................24 
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber24 
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
         ...........................................................24 
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....25 
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 
         entities [OMITTED].........................................25 
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................25 
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................25 
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber26 
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed 
         certificate................................................26 
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...26 
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 
         entities [OMITTED].........................................26 
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................26 
 
 
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         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26 
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........27 
         4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to 
         subscriber.................................................27 
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................27 
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27 
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 
         entities [OMITTED].........................................27 
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................28 
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28 
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
         ...........................................................28 
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28 
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability 
         [OMITTED]..................................................29 
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29 
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available 
         [OMITTED]..................................................29 
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...29 
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............29 
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............29 
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........29 
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............29 
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................29 
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29 
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29 
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29 
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29 
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29 
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................29 
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and 
         practices [OMITTED]........................................29 
   5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30 
      5.1. Physical controls........................................30 
         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30 
         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30 
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30 
         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30 
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30 
 
 
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         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30 
         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30 
         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30 
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................30 
         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30 
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30 
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30 
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30 
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30 
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements31 
         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31 
         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31 
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31 
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31 
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31 
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31 
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31 
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31 
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31 
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31 
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32 
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32 
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32 
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) 
         [OMITTED]..................................................32 
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32 
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32 
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32 
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32 
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32 
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32 
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32 
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].32 
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) 
         [OMITTED]..................................................32 
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information 
         [OMITTED]..................................................32 
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................32 
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33 
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]33 
         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted 
         [OMITTED]..................................................33 
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33 
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster 
         [OMITTED]..................................................33 
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33 
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................34 
 
 
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      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34 
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34 
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34 
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34 
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34 
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35 
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking35 
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)35 
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 
      Controls......................................................35 
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35 
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35 
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36 
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36 
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................36 
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
         ...........................................................36 
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36 
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36 
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36 
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36 
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37 
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37 
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37 
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage 
         periods....................................................37 
      6.4. Activation data..........................................37 
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37 
         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37 
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37 
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................37 
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37 
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38 
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38 
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................38 
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................38 
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38 
      6.7. Network security controls................................38 
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................38 
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39 
      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39 
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39 
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39 
            7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39 
            7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]....39 
            7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39 
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39 
 
 
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         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39 
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39 
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39 
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39 
         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39 
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate 
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39 
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39 
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39 
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39 
            7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............39 
            7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]............39 
            7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............40 
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40 
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40 
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40 
   8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41 
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41 
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41 
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41 
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41 
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41 
      8.6. Communication of results.................................41 
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42 
      9.1. Fees.....................................................43 
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43 
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43 
         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43 
      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43 
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43 
         9.2.2. Other assets........................................43 
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43 
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43 
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43 
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential 
         information................................................43 
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43 
      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43 
         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43 
         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43 
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43 
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43 
         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43 
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative 
         process....................................................43 
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43 
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43 
 
 
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      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43 
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43 
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........43 
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44 
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants 
         [OMITTED]..................................................44 
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44 
      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44 
      9.9. Indemnities..............................................44 
      9.10. Term and termination....................................44 
         9.10.1. Term...............................................44 
         9.10.2. Termination........................................44 
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44 
      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44 
      9.12. Amendments..............................................44 
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44 
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44 
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................44 
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44 
      9.14. Governing law...........................................44 
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44 
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44 
         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44 
         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44 
         9.16.3. Severability.......................................44 
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).44 
         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................44 
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44 
   10. Security Considerations......................................45 
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................45 
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................45 
   13. References...................................................46 
      13.1. Normative References....................................46 
      13.2. Informative References..................................46 
   Author's Addresses...............................................47 
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................48 
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48 
   Copyright Statement..............................................48 
 
Preface 

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a 
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry 
   or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Internet IP 
   Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure 
   (PKI).  The user of this document should  
 
 
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     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of 
        LIR/ISP> Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP 
        Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)'' with 
        date, author, etc. 

     2. leave the table of contents 

     3. delete this Preface 

     4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle 
        brackets> 

     5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's 
        Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of 
        Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a 
        reference section with just the references in 13.2  

     6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by 
        steps 4 and 5 above . 

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A 
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this 
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained 
   section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in 
   order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme 
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are 
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant 
   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect 
   in the Introduction below.  This information should be left in the 
   CPS as an explanation to the user. 

1. Introduction 

   This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name 
   of LIR/ISP>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of 
   LIR/ISP> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and 
   Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI.   These practices are defined in 
   accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, 
   [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.  

   The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting 
   improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that 
   allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, 
   issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates 
   will enable verification that the holder of the associated private 
   key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, 
   and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The 
 
 
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   certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed 
   data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security 
   mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.   

   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which 
   this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an 
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name 
   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each 
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity 
   to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of 
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the 
   entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the 
   assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to 
   digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using 
   the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and 
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI 
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims 
   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on 
   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and 
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of 
   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses. 

   For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not 
   allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive 
   AS numbers from the RIR for their region.  Thus, the certificates 
   issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations. 
   However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI 
   may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers. 

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A 
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this 
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained 
   section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in 
   order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme 
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are 
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant 
   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. 

1.1. Overview 

   This CPS describes: 

o  Participants  

o  Distribution of the certificates and CRLs 

o  How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked 
 
 
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o  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) 

o  Key management 

o  Audit procedures 

o  Business and legal issues 

   The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in 
   the CP for more details): 

o  CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks 
   and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder 

o  End entity (''shadow'') certificates for organizations to use in 
   verifying Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-
   certificate/CRL) signed objects 

o  In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in 
   support of access control for the repository system  

1.2. Document name and identification 

   The name of this document is ''<Name of LIR/ISP>'s Certification 
   Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI''.  

1.3. PKI participants 

   Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or 
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The 
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without 
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of 
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives 
   service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term ''subscriber'' can 
   refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, 
   and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are 
   subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also 
   note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as 
   organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When 
   necessary, the phrase ''network subscriber'' is used to refer to an 
   organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP. 

1.3.1. Certification authorities 

   <Name of LIR/ISP> will operate a CA, the primary function of which is 
   the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space 
   is allocated by <Name of LIR/ISP>. This CA will also issue end entity 
 
 
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   (''shadow'') certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In 
   the future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) 
   certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in 
   support of repository maintenance. 

1.3.2. Registration authorities 

   For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this 
   function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already 
   performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with 
   each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and 
   tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP 
   operates the CA, there is no distinct RA.  

1.3.3. Subscribers 

   The primary types of organizations that receive allocations of IP 
   addresses from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are 
   network subscribers.  <If appropriate, add ''Additionally, this LIR 
   issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.''> 

1.3.4. Relying parties 

   Entities that need to validate claims of address space current 
   holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example, entities that make 
   use of address certificates in support of improved routing security 
   are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed 
   organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and 
   subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one 
   ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP 
   to originate routes to this space.  

   To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access 
   control -- checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and 
   ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties. 

1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED] 

    

1.4. Certificate usage 

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses 

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in 
   support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space 
   and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing 
 
 
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   security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set 
   of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS 
   number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to 
   these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. 
   Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited 
   above, are also permitted under this policy. 

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy 
   could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., 
   access control for the repository system. Such uses also are 
   permitted under this policy.  

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses 

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. 

1.5. Policy administration 

1.5.1. Organization administering the document 

   This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP> 

1.5.2. Contact person 

   <Insert ISP contact info here> 

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy 

   Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI 
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS 
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public 
   key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same 
   organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are 
   authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.  

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures 

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI 
   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS 
   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public 
   key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same 
   organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are 
   authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.  




 
 
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1.6. Definitions and acronyms 


CP  -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates 
       the applicability of a certificate to a particular 
       community and/or class of applications with common security 
       requirements. 

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that 
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs 
       in issuing certificates. 

ISP -  Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing 
       and selling Internet services to other organizations. 

LIR -  Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a 
       network service provider,  that sub allocates the assignment of 
       IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or 
       National) Registry.   

NIR -  National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that 
       manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a 
       portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. 
       These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to 
       manage IP address and AS number allocation.  

RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that 
       manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a 
       specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs: 
       ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia-Pacific), 
       LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).  

ROA -  Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed 
       object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS, 
       that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of 
       address blocks. 







 
 
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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 

2.1. Repositories 

   As per the CP, certificates and CRLs will be made available for 
   downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this 
   data for use in support of routing security.  

   <If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic 
   set up.> 

2.2. Publication of certification information 

   <Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a 
   repository that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system 
   of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> will also upload to this 
   repository system any ROAs that it creates. 

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication 

   <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global 
   repository system) of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If 
   you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to 
   provide this information for relying parties.>  

   As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times 
   and frequency: 

o  A certificate will be published within 24 hours after a CA has 
   received acknowledgement from the subject of the certificate that the 
   certificate is accurate.  

o  The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA will publish its CRL prior to the 
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by 
   the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish 
   a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate. 

o  A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or 
   within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of 
   ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds. 







 
 
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2.4. Access controls on repositories  

o  Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must be 
   controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data 
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally 
   signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure 
   that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document 
   does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of 
   the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. 






































 
 
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3. Identification And Authentication 

3.1. Naming 

3.1.1. Types of names 

   The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP is identified 
   by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). It will consist of a single CN 
   attribute with a value generated by the issuer. 

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful 

   The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique 
   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. However, 
   there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique 
   in this PKI. 

   Note: The certificates issued under this PKI are used for 
   authorization in support of routing security, not for identification. 
   The name of the holder of an address block need not be ''meaningful'' 
   in the conventional, human-readable sense. 

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers 

   Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP need 
   not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a 
   function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature 
   is provided. 

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms 

   None 

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names 

   <Name of LIR/ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the 
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these 
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate 
   path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced 
   through technical means. 





 
 
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3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks 

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is 
   no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service 
   marks, etc. 

3.2. Initial identity validation 

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key 

   <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to 
   demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key 
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing 
   the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate 
   Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management 
   Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.> 

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity 

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the 
   organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of 
   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a 
   fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this ISP's 
   records.  

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each 
   certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with 
   regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub-
   allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The 
   specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate 
   with those you already employ as an ISP in the maintenance of address 
   allocation.> 

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity 

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual 
   identity of a resource holder. However, this ISP maintains contact 
   information for each resource holder in support of certificate 
   renewal, rekey, or revocation.  

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one 
   individual as a representative of each organization that is an 
   address space holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, 
   and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The 
   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in 
   authenticating individuals as representatives for address space 
   holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in 
 
 
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   dealing with the organizations to which you allocate (or sub-
   allocate) address space, and thus must not be relied upon outside of 
   this CA-subscriber relationship.> 

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information 

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued 
   under this certificate policy. 

3.2.5. Validation of authority 

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an 
   individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a 
   certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource 
   holder in this context.  The procedures should be commensurate with 
   those you already employ as an LIR/ISP in authenticating individuals 
   as representatives of resource holders.> 

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation 

   This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any 
   other PKI.  

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key 

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an 
   organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the 
   certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed.  This 
   should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the 
   private key corresponding to the new public key.   With respect to 
   authentication of the holder of the address space, the procedures 
   should be commensurate with those you already employ in the 
   maintenance of address allocation.  Note that your organization can 
   choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual 
   agreements with the recipient.> 

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation 

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an 
   organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate 
   holder of the address space in the certificate being re-keyed. This 
   should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the 
   private key corresponding to the new public key.  With respect to 
   authentication of the resource holder, the procedures should be 

 
 
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   commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of 
   resource allocation records.> 

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request 

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the 
   resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the 
   certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked. 
   Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the 
   legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as 
   opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.These 
   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in 
   the maintenance of resource holder records.> 

   Note:  If additional IP addresses are being added to an 
   organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not 
   revoked. Instead, a new certificate is issued with both the old and 
   the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are 
   being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old 
   certificate will be revoked (and a re-key will be performed in the 
   event of a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its 
   resource holdings be spread over a set of certificates, rather than 
   consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be 
   appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource 
   allocations as distinct allocations within his organization. 






















 
 
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4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements  

4.1. Certificate Application 

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application 

   The following entities may submit a certificate application to this 
   CA: 

       o <Insert if appropriate: ''Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.''>  

       o Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP 

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 

   <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for 
   initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that 
   most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of ISP normal 
   business practices, as an adjunct to address space allocation, and 
   thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be 
   necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices 
   are documented.> 

4.2. Certificate application processing 

   <Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will 
   employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate 
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210, 
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management 
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS, 
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >  

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 

   <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of 
   certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you to 
   identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance 
   of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be made to 
   documentation of such existing practices.> 

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications 

   <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications 
   and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to 
   this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate 
   applications will be approved based on the normal business practices 
   of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address 
 
 
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   space holders. Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the 
   corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to 
   the certificate the CA issues to the requester.> 

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 

   <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing 
   certificate applications.> 

4.3. Certificate issuance 

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance 

   <Describe in this section the following (referring to subsequent 
   sections as appropriate): 

o  Procedures for generation of a draft certificate and form of the 
   draft. Typically a draft certificate is a complete certificate except 
   for the issuer's signature. 

o  Procedure for making the draft available to the applicant for review. 
   For example, you may directly transmit the draft certificate to the 
   subscriber (applying PKCS #7 or other defined syntax).  
   Alternatively, you might establish a repository where draft 
   certificates can be examined. 

o  Procedure for subscriber approval/rejection of the draft  (Section 
   4.4.1) 

o  If draft is approved, procedure for finalization of draft and 
   subsequent publication (Section 4.4.2) 

o  If draft is rejected, procedure for modification of the rejected 
   certificate (Section 4.8 might be useful) or submission of a new 
   certificate request.> 

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate 

   <Describe your procedure for notification of a subscriber when a 
   draft certificate is ready for review.> 







 
 
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4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 
   [OMITTED] 

4.4. Certificate acceptance 

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance 

   When a draft certificate is generated and the subscriber is notified, 
   it is required that the subscriber review the proposed certificate 
   and either approve or reject it within <X -- This should be 30 or 
   fewer as per the CP.> days. <Describe what constitutes acceptance or 
   rejection from the certificate applicant.> 

   If a certificate remains unprocessed by the requester after <X> days, 
   <Describe your policy for handling certificates that have not been 
   acknowledged (either positively or negatively) after X days.  For 
   example, at your option, you may either cancel the certificate or 
   finalize it and place it in the repository.> 

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA 

   Certificates will be published in the Repository system once 
   approved. <Describe your procedures for publication of the approved 
   certificate.> 

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage 

   Use of the credentials from the IP Address and AS Number PKI is 
   discussed in detail in the Appendix of the CP. 

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage 

   The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA 
   certificates. The private key associated with each of these 
   certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and 
   CRLs.  Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates 
   to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or 
   more end entity ''shadow'' certificates for use in verifying 
   signatures on ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in 
   support of repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders 
   will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since they 
   will not be allocating address space to other organizations. 

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage 

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use 
   shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating 
 
 
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   route filters.  Repositories will use operator certificates to verify 
   the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance 
   activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of 
   relying party. 

4.6. Certificate renewal 

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal 

   As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on 
   its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate 
   Subject.  If <Name of LIR/ISP> initiates the renewal process based on 
   the certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> will notify 
   the resource holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 
   weeks in advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, 
   e.g., ''in conjunction with notification of service expiration''.>  
   The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap 
   that of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, 
   e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.  

   Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the 
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as 
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of 
   Section 4.7 will apply. 

4.6.2. Who may request renewal 

   The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the renewal 
   process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps 
   will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity 
   requesting the renewal.> 

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests 

  <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.  
  This must include verification that the certificate in question has 
  not been revoked.>  
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 

   <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance 
   to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.> 

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate 

   <Describe your definition of what constitutes acceptance of a renewed 
   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.1.> 
 
 
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4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA 

   <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed 
   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.> 

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 
   [OMITTED] 

4.7. Certificate re-key 

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key 

   As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when 
   required, based on: 

   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated 
      private key, or  

   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key 
      pair  

   If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the 
   replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a 
   new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. 

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous 
   certificate will be revoked.  

   Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a 
   certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that 
   exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places 
   additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key 

   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, 
   <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate a re-key based on a verified 
   compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify the 
   identity and authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when 
   the private key has been reported as compromised. Also describe how a 
   compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>  

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests 

   <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the 
   CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section 
   4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.> 
 
 
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4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 

   <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re: 
   availability of the new certificate.  This should be consistent with 
   the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see 
   section 4.3.2).> 

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate 

   <Describe your policy regarding acceptance of the new certificate by 
   the subscriber.  This should be consistent with the acceptance 
   process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1).> 

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA 

   <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.  
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new 
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).> 

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 
   [OMITTED] 

4.8. Certificate modification 

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification 

   As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement 
   changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A 
   subscriber can request a certificate modification when this 
   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result 
   of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber.   

   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space in addition to a 
   current allocation, then this is accomplished through a certificate 
   modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new 
   certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same 
   public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, 
   but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address 
   space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address 
   space is to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate 
   MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation) 
   issued.  

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification 

   The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the 
   certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate 
 
 
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   holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity 
   and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.> 

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests 

   <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification 
   request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These 
   should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and 
   4.3.1.> 

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber 

   <Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified 
   certificate.  This should be consistent with the notification process 
   for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).> 

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate 

   <Describe your criteria for acceptance of a modified certificate.  
   This should be consistent with the acceptance process for any new 
   certificate (see section 4.4.1).> 

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA 

   <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.  
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new 
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).> 

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 
   [OMITTED] 

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation 

   As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.  
   Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the 
   relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to 
   revoke the certificate.  A certificate also may be revoked due to 
   loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key 
   in the certificate.  Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order 
   to invalidate data signed by that certificate.   

4.9.2. Who can request revocation 

   The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may request a revocation. 
   <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps will be 
 
 
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   taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity 
   requesting the revocation.> 

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request 

   <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.  
   This should include:  

o  Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a 
   revocation 

o  Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the 
   revocation is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.> 

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period 

   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the 
   need for revocation has been identified.  

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 

   <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will 
   process a revocation request.> 

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties 

   As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and 
   checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the 
   certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency  

   <Name of LIR/ISP> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours.  
   Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be 
   published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> will set the 
   nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the 
   next scheduled CRL will be issued. 

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs  

   A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay 
   after generation. 





 
 
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4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] 

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] 

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] 

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] 

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] 

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] 

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] 

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] 

4.10. Certificate status services 

   <Name of LIR/ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP. 

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED} 

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED] 

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED] 

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED] 

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED] 

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] 

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices 
   [OMITTED] 













 
 
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5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 

    

5.1. Physical controls 

   <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for 
   certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in 
   the management of address space allocation.> 

5.1.1. Site location and construction 

5.1.2. Physical access 

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 

5.1.4. Water exposures 

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 

5.1.6. Media storage 

5.1.7. Waste disposal 

5.1.8. Off-site backup 

5.2. Procedural controls 

   <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you 
   employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to 
   those used in the management of address space allocation.> 

5.2.1. Trusted roles 

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task  

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role  

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties  

5.3. Personnel controls 

   <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you 
   employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These 
   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address 
   space allocation.> 

 
 
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5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 

5.3.2. Background check procedures 

5.3.3. Training requirements 

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 

5.4. Audit logging procedures 

5.4.1. Types of events recorded 

   Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the 
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will 
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary 
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include: 


  . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) 

  . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate 
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise 
     notifications) 

  . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions 

  . Posting of any material to a repository 

  . Any attempts to change or delete audit data 
   <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>   

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log 

   <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.> 



 
 
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5.4.3. Retention period for audit log 

   <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.> 

5.4.4. Protection of audit log 

   <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>  

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 

   <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.> 

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 

   <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have 
   already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether 
   such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to 
   perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.> 

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED] 

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED] 

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED] 

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED] 

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED] 

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED] 

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED] 

5.6. Key changeover 

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period 
   that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA 
   certificate.  To support this, <Name of LIR/ISP> will create a new 
   signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate 
   containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum 

 
 
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   amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''> in advance 
   of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. 

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED] 

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted 
   [OMITTED] 

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED] 

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED] 

5.8. CA or RA termination 

   <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address 
   space allocations in case of its own termination.> 





























 
 
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6. Technical Security Controls 

   This section describes the security controls used by <Name of 
   LIR/ISP>.  

6.1. Key pair generation and installation 

6.1.1. Key pair generation 

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key 
   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In most 
   instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber, 
   i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space.  
   However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on 
   behalf of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done 
   for subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation 
   in a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the 
   subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for 
   non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not 
   inherently undermine the security of the PKI.> 

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation 
   services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys 
   are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this 
   is not applicable.> 

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer 

   <Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you, 
   e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing 
   Request (CSR).  This description should explain how this public key 
   delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP 
   address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The 
   security of the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public 
   key to you need only be commensurate with the security of the 
   procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.> 

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties 

   Except for the Root CA, all CA public keys used in this PKI are 
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published 
   via a repository system. Relying parties will download these 
   certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data 
   for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, 

 
 
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   e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made 
   available to the Internet community. 

6.1.5. Key sizes 

   For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate and shadow CA certificate, 
   the RSA key size will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024 
   bits.>   

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking 

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent 
   (e) F4 (65,537).  

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, 
   insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible 
   for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that 
   <Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for 
   subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking 
   the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> 

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) 

   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. 
   For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign 
   bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) 
   will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. 
   <Specify whether end entity certificates (issued by the CA for its 
   operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit 
   values as per RFC 3280.> 

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 
   Controls 

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls 

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated 
   under FIPS 140-2, at level 4 [FIPS].  

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control 

   <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to 
   this CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will 
   be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person 
   control.''>  


 
 
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6.2.3. Private key escrow 

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. 

6.2.4. Private key backup 

   <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.  
   The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be 
   done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling 
   the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at an 
   off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.> 
6.2.5. Private key archival 

   See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module 

   The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA and shadow CA will be 
   generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.  The 
   private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for 
   backup and/or transfer to a new module. 
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module 

   The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA will be stored in the 
   cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in 
   accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module. 
   (See [FIPS]) 

6.2.8. Method of activating private key 

   <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private 
   key.> 

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key 

   The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left 
   unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the 
   procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will 
   be stored securely when not in use. 

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key 

   <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g., 
   when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular module.> 


 
 
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6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating 

   The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 2 or 
   3 [FIPS].  

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 

6.3.1. Public key archival 

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need 
   to archive public keys. 

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods 

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of 
   <insert number of years -- LIR/ISP key pairs and certificates should 
   have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize 
   the disruption caused by key changeover.>   

6.4. Activation data 

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 

   <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.> 

6.4.2. Activation data protection 

   Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe 
   your procedures here>. 

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 

   <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the 
   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''> 

6.5. Computer security controls 

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement 

   <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to 
   support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit 
   capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with 
   those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP 
   addresses.> 



 
 
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6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] 

6.6. Life cycle technical controls 

6.6.1. System development controls 

   <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the 
   PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology 
   (TSDM) Level 2.> 

6.6.2. Security management controls 

   <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the 
   software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures 
   should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the 
   CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.> 

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 

   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI 
   functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.  This 
   should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which 
   equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space is 
   handled. >  
6.7. Network security controls 

   <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA 
   operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security 
   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of 
   IP addresses.> 

6.8. Time-stamping 

   The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. 












 
 
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7. Certificate and CRL Profiles 

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-res-
   certs-01.  

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] 

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED] 

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED] 

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED] 

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED] 

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED] 

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED] 

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED] 

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies 
   extension [OMITTED] 

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED] 

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED] 

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED] 

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED] 

    




 
 
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7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED] 

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED] 

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED] 






































 
 
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8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments 

   <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the 
   security of the administration of IP addresses. These are sufficient 
   for the PKI systems.> 

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 

8.4. Topics covered by assessment 

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 

8.6. Communication of results 






























 
 
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9. Other Business And Legal Matters 

    

   <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for 
   your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your 
   business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with 
   the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the 
   allocation of IP addresses.>  






































 
 
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9.1. Fees 

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 

9.1.3. Refund policy 

9.2. Financial responsibility 

9.2.1. Insurance coverage  

9.2.2. Other assets 

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 

9.3. Confidentiality of business information 

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 

9.4. Privacy of personal information 

9.4.1. Privacy plan 

9.4.2. Information treated as private 

9.4.3. Information not deemed private 

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information 

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 

9.6. Representations and warranties 

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 
 
 
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9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties 

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] 

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 

9.8. Limitations of liability 

9.9. Indemnities 

9.10. Term and termination 

9.10.1. Term 

9.10.2. Termination 

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 

9.12. Amendments 

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period  

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] 

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 

9.14. Governing law 

9.15. Compliance with applicable law 

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions 

9.16.1. Entire agreement 

9.16.2. Assignment 

9.16.3. Severability 

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 

9.16.5. Force Majeure 

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED] 
 
 
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10. Security Considerations 

   The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in 
   a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can include 
   the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in 
   authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, 
   and technical security controls, including the scope of the 
   subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private 
   key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and 
   conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of 
   warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a 
   framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and 
   physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration 
   Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party 
   cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate 
   generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is 
   done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and 
   Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational 
   Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational 
   Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7 
   Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and 
   Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of 
   the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and 
   relying party systems. 

    

11. IANA Considerations 

   None. 

12. Acknowledgments 

    













 
 
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13. References 

13.1. Normative References 

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 

   [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 
             Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate 
             Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 
             1997. 

   [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate 
             Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", RFC 
             xxxx. 

   [RFCYYYY] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., ''A Profile for 
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress, June 
             19, 2006. 

13.2. Informative References 

   [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 
             (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. 

   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 
             (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
             Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National 
             Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. 

    [RSA]   Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method 
             for obtaining digital signatures and public-key 
             cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. 

    

    

    

    






 
 
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Author's Addresses 

   Stephen Kent 
   BBN Technologies 
   10 Moulton Street 
   Cambridge MA 02138 
   USA 

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 
   Email: skent@bbn.com 
    
   Derrick Kong 
   BBN Technologies 
   10 Moulton Street 
   Cambridge MA 02138 
   USA 
       
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 
   Email: dkong@bbn.com 
    
   Karen Seo 
   BBN Technologies 
   10 Moulton Street 
   Cambridge MA 02138 
   USA 
       
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 
   Email: kseo@bbn.com 
    
    

    

    

    

    

    

    

    



 
 
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Intellectual Property Statement 

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information 
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be 
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. 

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any 
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an 
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of 
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this 
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at 
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr. 

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any 
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary 
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement 
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at 
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org. 

Disclaimer of Validity 

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 

Copyright Statement 

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 
   retain all their rights. 

     




 
 
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