Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Seo, K. Internet Draft Watro, R. Expires: August 2007 Kong, D. Intended Status: Informational Kent, S. BBN Technologies February 2007 Certificate Policy (CP) for the Internet IP Address and AS Number (PKI) draft-ietf-sidr-cp-01.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2007. Abstract This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to support improved routing security. Each organization that allocates IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the Seo,Watro,Kong&Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this policy are employed, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. Table of Contents 1. Introduction...................................................9 1.1. Overview..................................................9 1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12 1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................13 1.3.5. Other participants..................................13 1.4. Certificate usage........................................13 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 1.5. Policy administration....................................13 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............14 1.5.2. Contact person......................................14 1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy....14 1.5.4. CP approval procedures..............................14 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................15 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................16 2.1. Repositories.............................................16 2.2. Publication of certification information.................16 2.3. Time or frequency of publication.........................16 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................16 3. Identification And Authentication.............................17 3.1. Naming...................................................17 3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.18 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key19 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation.................................................19 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions ...........................................................21 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...22 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................22 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................23 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................23 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........23 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............23 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................23 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................24 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................24 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................24 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................24 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate................................................24 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................25 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................25 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................25 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................25 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate................................................26 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...26 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................26 4.8. Certificate modification.................................26 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber ...........................................................27 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate ...........................................................27 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................27 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request....................................................28 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]..................................................29 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]..................................................29 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...29 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............29 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............29 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........29 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............29 4.10. Certificate status services.............................29 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............29 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] ...........................................................29 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]........................................29 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................30 5.1. Physical controls........................................30 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED]............30 5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED]...........................30 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED]................30 5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED]...........................30 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED]............30 5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED].............................30 5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED]............................30 5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED]...........................30 5.2. Procedural controls......................................30 5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED].............................30 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED].......30 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role [OMITTED]..................................................30 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED]......30 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements [OMITTED]..................................................31 5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED]...............31 5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED].....................31 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED].....31 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED].......31 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED]........31 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED].......31 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED].......31 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................31 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]..................................................32 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].32 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]..................................................32 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]..................................................32 5.6. Key changeover...........................................32 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]33 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED]........................................33 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]..................................................33 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33 6. Technical Security Controls...................................34 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking35 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)35 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls......................................................35 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36 6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED]......................36 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module [OMITTED]...........................................36 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED]36 6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED]..........36 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED]........36 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED].........36 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED]..............36 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................36 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................36 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods....................................................36 6.4. Activation data [OMITTED]................................37 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED]37 6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED]................37 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED]..........37 6.5. Computer security controls...............................37 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements [OMITTED]..................................................37 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................37 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................37 6.6.1. System development controls.........................37 6.6.2. Security management controls........................37 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................37 6.7. Network security controls................................37 6.8. Time-stamping............................................37 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................38 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................38 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................38 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............38 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................38 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................38 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......38 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....38 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....38 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................38 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................38 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............38 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................38 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................38 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................39 8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................40 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED].......40 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED]............40 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED].....40 8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED]...................40 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED]........40 8.6 Communication of results [OMITTED]......................40 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................41 9.1. Fees.....................................................41 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................41 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............41 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................41 9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED]...................41 9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED].............................41 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................41 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................41 9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED]..............................41 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities [OMITTED]..................................................41 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................41 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................41 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information................................................41 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..41 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................41 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................41 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................41 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................42 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......42 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......42 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process....................................................42 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........42 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............42 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................42 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................42 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........42 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED] ...........................................................42 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]..................................................42 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................42 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................42 9.9. Indemnities..............................................42 9.10. Term and termination....................................42 9.10.1. Term...............................................42 9.10.2. Termination........................................42 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................42 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.42 9.12. Amendments..............................................42 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................42 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................42 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]..................................................42 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................42 9.14. Governing law...........................................43 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................43 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................43 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................43 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................43 9.16.3. Severability.......................................43 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).43 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................43 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................43 10. Security Considerations......................................44 11. IANA Considerations..........................................44 12. Acknowledgments..............................................44 13. References...................................................44 13.1. Normative References....................................44 13.2. Informative References..................................44 Author's Addresses...............................................46 Intellectual Property Statement..................................47 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................47 Copyright Statement..............................................47 Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 1. Introduction This document describes the certificate policy for a PKI used to support improved routing security. An organization that allocates IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The PKI in which the certificates issued under this policy are employed can be used in a number of ways, for example, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, it can be used to provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by ISPs. The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties should reject such uses. Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this policy because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. 1.1. Overview This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of IP (v4 and v6) address space, and AS numbers, in Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 accordance with the (current) records of the registries and ISPs that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous allocation of these resources, and this, in turn, is an essential underpinning of routing in the public Internet. Internet routing is based on a distributed system of many routers, which are grouped into management domains called Autonomous Systems (ASes). Routing information is exchanged between ASes using Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [BGP4] UPDATE messages. BGP has proven to be highly vulnerable to a variety of attacks [Murphy], due to the lack of a scalable means of verifying the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control traffic, e.g., route originations. This PKI, and ancillary, signed data, will support detection of bogus route originations and facilitate routing security enhancements by network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), e.g., creation of accurate route filters. (Bogus route origination occurs whenever an AS advertises itself as the origin AS for a prefix, without being authorized to do so by the legitimate holder of the prefix.) The proposed security infrastructure consists of three components: a PKI, repositories, and digitally signed objects called route origination authorizations (ROAs). The PKI authoritatively documents the current allocation of address blocks and AS numbers to organizations, as recorded by the organizations that manage such allocations. (For brevity, this document uses the term "organization" to refer to every resource holder, even if the holder is an individual.) A ROA is a digitally signed object by which an address space holder explicitly authorizes one or more ASes to originate routes to its address space. Repositories provide the means of distributing the PKI data (certificates and CRLs) and ROA data to relying parties. The intent is each network operator uploads its new or updated PKI and ROA data periodically to repositories, e.g., daily. On a similar schedule, each network operator also is expected to download new or updated data uploaded by others. From this data, operators extract authenticated address block origination data, which can be used to validate routing requests or to construct route filters in a more secure fashion than is currently offered via Internet Routing Registries (IRRs). This PKI parallels the existing IP address and AS number allocation hierarchy. These resources are allocated by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs -- ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa) which act as default trust anchors for the PKI. In some regions, national (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for address allocation. ISPs and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries. (ISPs who acquire allocations from RIRs or Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 NIRs, and who sub-allocate address space are referred to as Local Internet Registries (LIRs)). The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see draft-ietf- sidr-arch-00 [ARCH] for more details): . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder . End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in verifying ROAs and other (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects . In the future the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.2. Document name and identification The name of this document is "Certificate Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI". This policy has been assigned the following OID: id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 } 1.3. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an ISP. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 1.3.1. Certification authorities The organizations that allocate IP addresses (RIRs, NIRs, LIRs) and AS numbers (RIRs and NIRs) act as CAs in this PKI. Non-ISP organizations that hold address space will create and sign ROAs and hence will issue shadow certificates (and may issue other types of EE certificates in the future). Thus they too must act as CAs in this PKI. 1.3.2. Registration authorities This function will be provided by the CAs listed in Section 1.3.1. The RIRs (and NIRs where applicable) already perform this function and assume responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS numbers. LIRs do the same for sub-allocation of address space that they hold. With regard to allocation of IP address and AS numbers, RIRs et al. establish a formal relationship with an organization and allocate these resources to that organization. 1.3.3. Subscribers These are the organizations receiving allocations of IP addresses and AS numbers as shown in Figures 1 and 2. . For IP address allocations, o a non-ISP organization can be a subscriber of an ISP, LIR, NIR, or an RIR, o an ISP can be a subscriber of an LIR, NIR, or RIR o an NIR or LIR is a subscriber of an RIR . For AS number allocations, o network subscribers and ISPs/LIRs are subscribers of RIRs and NIRs. Note that any of these organizations may have received allocations from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs, which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This the PKI accommodates such relationships. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 1.3.4. Relying parties Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make use of address and AS number allocation certificates in support of improved routing security are relying parties. This includes ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP traffic with ISPs, and subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from ISP A but want to authorize ISP B to originate routes to this space. To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and ROA update packages, and they too act as relying parties. 1.3.5. Other participants RIRs (and perhaps NIRs) will operate repositories that hold certificates, CRLs, and other signed objects, e.g., ROAs. 1.4. Certificate usage 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system. Such uses also are permitted under this policy. 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited under this policy. 1.5. Policy administration [What organization/contact would the WG like to put here? This section includes the name and mailing address of the organization Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 that is responsible for the drafting, registering, maintaining, and updating of this CP. It also includes the name, electronic mail address, telephone number, and fax number of a contact person. As an alternative to naming an actual person, the document may name a title or role, an e-mail alias, and other generalized contact information. We have left "NRO" for now since it would be simplest to have just one organization/contact handle these responsibilities. Another possibility would be to have Section 1.5.1 point to: . IETF RFC Editor for distribution and making the document available. . IETF SIDR Working Group for document drafting, content maintenance and updating. And have Section 1.5.2 have the corresponding contact info, i.e., the email addresses for the IETF RFC Editor and the Working Group Chairs for the SIDR Working Group.] 1.5.1. Organization administering the document This CP is administered by the ???. [It would be nice to have a single organization responsible for 1.5.2. Contact person [insert contact info here] 1.5.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. These are the same organizations that perform the allocation hence they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. 1.5.4. CP approval procedures Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organization is the same organization as the one that performs the allocation. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 1.6. Definitions and acronyms BGP - Border Gateway Protocol. This is the protocol used in the Internet for propagating the connectivity information used as a basis for inter-domain routing. [BGP4] CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations. LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or National) Registry. NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs: ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa). ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of address blocks. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2.1. Repositories Certificates, CRLs, and ROAs must be made available for downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this data for use in support of routing security. This motivates use of a robust repository system. Since this data will be accessed by a very large number of network operators around the world, multiple repositories are required to provide redundancy and for load sharing. As a starting point, a repository will be operated by each RIR. 2.2. Publication of certification information All CAs will publish certificates via the repository system. Each CA will publish the CRL(s) that it issues by uploading to the repository system. ROAs will be uploaded to the repository system by address space holders, e.g., network subscribers and ISPs/LIRs. An organization may choose to outsource publication of PKI data. 2.3. Time or frequency of publication A certificate will be published within 24 hours after a CA has received acknowledgement from the subject of the certificate that the certificate is accurate. Each CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate. A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds. 2.4. Access controls on repositories Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 3. Identification And Authentication 3.1. Naming 3.1.1. Types of names Names for RIRs and NIRs will be directory distinguished names, using a subset of the following attributes: C, O, OU, and CN. Names for LIRs/ISPs and subscribers will consist of a single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each certificate must be unique relative to all Subject names certified by an Issuer, but the name does not need to be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee, that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification. The intent is to allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to announce to the Internet, in a secure fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to these addresses. The PKI binds a public key to each address block or AS number. The name of the holder of the address block or AS number need not be "meaningful" or even accurate. For purposes of routing security, the issuer and subject name in each certificate are not relevant, other than the usual PKI requirements for contextual uniqueness in support of unambiguous certificate path chaining. 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names Each CA certifies Subject names that must be unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced through technical means. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc. 3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will require each Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA. 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has allocated (or sub-allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The same requirement is imposed on the binding of one or more AS numbers in a certificate to the organization represented by the Subject. The specific procedures employed for this purpose may vary among CAs. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of each organization that is an address space (AS number) holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The specific means by which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an organization may vary, and will be specified in the CPS of the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS number) holders. Moreover, this authentication is solely for use by each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it allocates (or sub-allocates) address space (or AS numbers), and thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy. 3.2.5. Validation of authority Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that organization in this context. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for address space (AS number) holders. 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. The means by which PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be declared in the CPS of that CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note: An issuer may choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the recipient. 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be re-keyed and will require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 CAs. The means by which PoP is achieved is up to each CA and will be declared in the certification practice statement of that CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the address space and AS numbers, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request Each CA operating within the context of this PKI will employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space and AS numbers) to be revoked. The specific procedures employed for these purposes may vary among CAs. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the maintenance of address (and AS number) allocation. Note: If new IP addresses or AS numbers are being added to an organization's existing allocation, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a new certificate may issued with both the old and the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old certificate must be revoked (and a re-key must be performed in the event of key compromise). Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application The IP Address and AS Number PKI issues several types of certificates. Any entity that assigns Internet IP address space or AS numbers should acquire a certificate. This includes registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that hold AS numbers or that have address space assignments from a registry, or that are multi-homed, should acquire a certificate under this PKI, even if they do not exchange BGP UPDATEs with ISPs. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities will include one or both of the extensions defined by RFC 3779, X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate. Most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of registry and ISP normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space and AS number allocation, and thus a separate specific application to request a certificate usually will not be necessary. 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities The enrollment process and procedures are based on the individual polices of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs/ISPs. An entity that desires one or more certificates should contact the authorized registry for its geopolitical area, or contact its LIR/ISP if it receives address allocations from an LIR/ISP. During the initial deployment of this PKI, registries and ISPs should contact their existing network subscribers about obtaining appropriate credentials. 4.2. Certificate application processing CAs should make use of existing standards for certificate application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS, and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. Each CA will define the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its CPS. 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to note that the IP Address and AS Number PKI is never used to authenticate the Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the address blocks and AS numbers they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal organization names, etc. 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications Certificate applications will be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders. Each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requestor. 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications No stipulation. Each CA may declare its expected time frame for processing certificate applications as part of its CPS. 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it will generate a draft version of the proposed certificate and make it available to the subscriber for review. Typically the draft form is a complete certificate except for the issuer's signature. The CA may directly transmit the draft certificate to the subscriber (applying PKCS #7 or other defined syntax). Alternatively, the CA might establish a repository where draft certificates can be examined. In any case, the subscriber will review and either approve or reject the draft certificate. If approved, the certificate is finalized and made available for repository access. If rejected, the certificate modification procedures in section 4.7 below can be applied, or a new certificate request can be submitted. 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate The subscriber shall be notified when a draft certificate is available for examination and approval. The means by which a subscriber is notified is defined by each CA in its CPS. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Positive acknowledgement from the certificate holder is required as part of certificate acceptance. When a draft certificate is generated and the subscriber is notified, it is required that the subscriber review the proposed certificate and either approve or reject it. However, if a certificate remains unprocessed by the requester after 30 days, the CA, at its option, may either cancel the certificate or finalize it and place it in the repository. Each CA shall state in its CPS the default action for draft certificates that are not approved within the 30-day review period. 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates will be published in the repository system once approved. 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is provided below. 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage Each holder of an address space or AS number allocation will be issued an X.509 certificate using RFC 3779 extensions. When the subjects of these certificates are LIRs/ISPs or network subscribers, they also shall issue "shadow" certificates to themselves for use in verifying ROAs. Subjects also will issue subordinate, end-entity certificates to their personnel for repository maintenance. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route filters. Repositories use certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus represent a secondary type of relying party. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal A certificate should be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that CA shall notify the holder in advance of the renewal process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate should overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal should incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal process. For example, a certificate holder may request an early renewal if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process at the normal expiration cycle. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests Renewal processing must verify that the certificate in question has not been revoked. 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.3.2. 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.1. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA No additional stipulations beyond those of section 4.4.2. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key Re-key of a certificate should be performed only when required, based on: 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair The re-key operation can have dramatic consequences, requiring the re-issuance of all certificates issued by a re-keyed entity, so it should be performed only when necessary. In particular, if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate can and should incorporate the same public key rather than a new key. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate must be revoked. Section 5.6 below notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, the CA that issued the certificate may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. Note that care must be taken to verify the authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when the private key has been reported as compromised. 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate generation as defined in section 4.3. 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2) Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1) 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.2) 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are additions to the address space and/or AS number holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension. When previously allocated address space or AS numbers are removed from a certificate, then the old certificate is revoked and a new certificate is issued. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address space and AS allocations expanded. Revocation of the previous certificate is not required. 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification The certificate holder or issuer may initiate the certificate modification process. 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests The CA must determine that the requested modification is appropriate and the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are followed. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.8.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No stipulation beyond the notification process for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2) 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate No stipulation beyond the acceptance process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.1). 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA No stipulation beyond the publication process for any new certificate (see section 4.4.2). 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED] 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation Certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either the issuer or subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by that certificate. For example, if the private key associated with a shadow certificate has been used to sign a ROA, then that shadow certificate can be revoked to effect revocation of the ROA. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation The certificate holder or issuer may request a revocation. 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request A certificate holder must submit a request to the certificate issuer for a revocation. A certificate issuer must notify the certificate holder when revoking a certificate, however this notification requirement is satisfied by publication of a CRL by the issuer. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace period for the subscriber in this process. 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request No stipulation. Each CA is free to specify its expected revocation processing time in its CPS. 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties A relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency As indicated in section 2.3, it is expected that CAs will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours, although the specific CRL issuance frequency is determine by each CA. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL must be published at or before that time. A CA must set the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued. 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs It is expected that a CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay after generation. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] 4.10. Certificate status services This PKI does not make use of OCSP or SCVP, because it is anticipated that the primary relying parties (ISPs) will acquire and validate certificates for all participating resource holders on a daily basis. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status checking. Instead, retrieval of all changed or new certificates and CRLs on a daily basis is the anticipated mode of certificate status verification. 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED] 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED] 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED] 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED] 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED] 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls Each CA will maintain physical security controls for its operation that are commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS. 5.1.1. Site location and construction [OMITTED] 5.1.2. Physical access [OMITTED] 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning [OMITTED] 5.1.4. Water exposures [OMITTED] 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection [OMITTED] 5.1.6. Media storage [OMITTED] 5.1.7. Waste disposal [OMITTED] 5.1.8. Off-site backup [OMITTED] 5.2. Procedural controls Each CA will maintain procedural security controls that are commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS. 5.2.1. Trusted roles [OMITTED] 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task [OMITTED] 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role [OMITTED] 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties [OMITTED] 5.3. Personnel controls Each CA will maintain personnel security controls that are commensurate with those already employed by the organization in the management of address space and AS number allocation. The details for each CA will be specified in the relevant CPS. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements [OMITTED] 5.3.2. Background check procedures [OMITTED] 5.3.3. Training requirements [OMITTED] 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements [OMITTED] 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence [OMITTED] 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions [OMITTED] 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements [OMITTED] 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel [OMITTED] 5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4.1. Types of events recorded Audit records should be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records should include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications) . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions . Posting of any material to a repository . Any attempts to change or delete audit data 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log Each CA will establish its own procedures for review of audit logs. 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log Each CA will establish its own polices for retention of audit logs. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5.4.4. Protection of audit log The audit log should be protected based on current industry standards. 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures The audit log should be backed up based on current industry standards. 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments The PKI subsystems of a registry or ISP should participate in any vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of their normal business practice. 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED] 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED] 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED] 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED] 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED] 5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED] 5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED] 5.6. Key changeover The private key that a CA uses to sign a certificate or CRL must have a validity period that is at least as long as that of the certificate being signed. This means that a CA must create a new signature key pair, and acquire a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, well in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED] 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED] 5.8. CA or RA termination In this PKI, each CA is authoritative for a specified range of IP addresses and a specified set of AS numbers. If an organization acting as a CA in this PKI terminates operation without identifying a replacement, then a portion of the address space and AS numbers will need to be managed without support for validating authorizations until a new CA is brought on-line. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 6. Technical Security Controls The organizations that allocate IP addresses and AS numbers to subscribers are authoritative for these allocations. This PKI is designed to enable LIRs/ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the holders of the resources that have been allocated to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for administering the allocation of IP address space and AS number data by the extant organizations. Details of each CA's security controls are described in the CPS issued by the CA. 6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1.1. Key pair generation In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subject, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space or AS numbers. However, some CAs may offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion. Since the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA will describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS. 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its CPS will describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer Each CA operating within the context of this PKI defines procedures whereby a subscriber requests IP address space (and/or AS numbers), authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The CPS of each CA will describe how these procedures are extended to support certificate issuance. The security of the procedures used by a subject to deliver its public key to a CA need only be commensurate with the security of the procedures already employed for management of the IP address space and AS numbers. 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. 6.1.5. Key sizes For RIR certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For NIR, LIR/ISP, and non-ISP subscriber certificates, the RSA keys will be either 2048 or 1024 bits. 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent (e) F4 (65,537). Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair. CAs are not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers. 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) The Key usage extension bit values shall be consistent with RFC 3280. For CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits shall be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) shall be set FALSE, and the extension shall be marked critical. End entity certificates in this PKI may include this extension, with appropriate bit values, as per RFC 3280, but such inclusion is not required. 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA will be described in the CPS issued by that CA. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control Some CAs, e.g., registry CAs, may employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for a CA will describe any multi-person controls it employs. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. 6.2.4. Private key backup Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA should employ a secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the procedures for backing up a CA's private key will be described in the CPS issued by the CA. 6.2.5. Private key archival [OMITTED] 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module [OMITTED] 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module [OMITTED] 6.2.8. Method of activating private key [OMITTED] 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key [OMITTED] 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key [OMITTED] 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating [OMITTED] 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3.1. Public key archival Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods The RIR and NIR key pairs and certificates should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs. LIR/ISP and subscriber certificates typically will have validity periods commensurate with the duration of service agreements. The validity periods will be chosen by the issuing CA and described in its CPS. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 6.4. Activation data [OMITTED] 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation [OMITTED] 6.4.2. Activation data protection [OMITTED] 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data [OMITTED] 6.5. Computer security controls Each CA will document the technical security requirements it employs for CA computer operation in its CPS. 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirements [OMITTED] 6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] 6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6.1. System development controls The CPS for each CA will document any system development controls required by that CA, if applicable. 6.6.2. Security management controls The security for the software and equipment used for this PKI shall be commensurate with that used for the systems used by the CAs for managing and allocating IP address and AS number resources. 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls Equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI shall be procured, installed, maintained, and updated in a fashion commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and AS numbers is handled. 6.7. Network security controls Each CA shall employ network security controls for CA operation commensurate with the protection it employs for the computers used for managing allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers. 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr- res-certs-01]. 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED] 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED] 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED] 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED] 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED] 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED] 7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension [OMITTED] 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED] 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED] 7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED] Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for the management of IP address space and AS numbers, and the PKI simply supports verification of the allocation if these resources to subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to ensure the security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers is sufficient for this PKI. 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment [OMITTED] 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor [OMITTED] 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity [OMITTED] 8.4. Topics covered by assessment [OMITTED] 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency [OMITTED] 8.6 Communication of results [OMITTED] Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 9. Other Business And Legal Matters As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations managing the allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers are authoritative in their roles as managers of this data. They will operate this PKI to allow the holders of address space and AS number allocations to generate digitally signed data that attests to these allocations, and to the authorization of LIRs/ISPs to originate routes for address blocks (via ROAs). Therefore, the manner in which the organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which they already manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. The topics listed below may be covered in the CPS issued by each CA. Not every CA may choose to address all of these topics. 9.1. Fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.3. Refund policy 9.1.4. Fees for other services [OMITTED] 9.1.5. Refund policy [OMITTED] 9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.2. Other assets [OMITTED] 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities [OMITTED] 9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.2. Information treated as private Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties [OMITTED] 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.8. Limitations of liability 9.9. Indemnities 9.10. Term and termination 9.10.1. Term 9.10.2. Termination 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.12. Amendments 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 9.14. Governing law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions 9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.3. Severability 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.5. Force Majeure 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED] Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 10. Security Considerations According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular application. This document describes the CP for the Internet Address and AS Number PKI. There are separate documents (Certification Practice Statements (CPS's) that cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability). 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this document. 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-01] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress, June 19, 2006. 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP- 4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 [Murphy] Murphy, S., BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis, draft-ietf- idr-bgp-vuln-01.txt, October 2004 (work in progress). [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. [S-BGP] Kent, S., Lynn, C., and Seo, K. Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP). IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, v.18, n. 4, Apr. 2000, pages 582-592. [soBGP] Russ White, Securing BGP Through Secure Origin BGP, The Internet Protocl Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, September 2003, pages 15- 22. [SPV] Hu, Y.-C., Perrig, A., and Sirbu, M., SPV: Secure Path Vector Routing for Securing BGP. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2004, pages 179-192. [ARCH] Kent S., Barnes R., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing," draft-ietf-sidr-arch-00.txt, February, 2007 (work in progress). Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 Author's Addresses Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 Email: skent@bbn.com Derrick Kong BBN Technologies Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951 Email: dkong@bbn.com Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Email: kseo@bbn.com Ronald Watro BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge MA 02138 USA Phone: +1 (617) 873-2551 Email: rwatro@bbn.com Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 46] Internet-Draft Cert Policy for IP Addr/AS# PKI February 2007 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Seo,Watro,Kong & Kent Expires August 2007 [Page 47]